The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Non-Infringing Use: Can Mandatory Labeling of Digital Media Products Keep the Sky from Falling? by Matesky, Michael P., II
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 1 Symposium: Final Status for Kosovo: 
Untying the Gordian Knot 
Article 20 
December 2004 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Non-Infringing Use: Can 
Mandatory Labeling of Digital Media Products Keep the Sky from 
Falling? 
Michael P. Matesky II 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael P. Matesky II, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Non-Infringing Use: Can Mandatory 
Labeling of Digital Media Products Keep the Sky from Falling?, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 515 (2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol80/iss1/20 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND NON-
INFRINGING USE: CAN MANDATORY LABELING OF DIGITAL
MEDIA PRODUCTS KEEP THE SKY FROM FALLING?
MICHAEL P. MATESKY, II*
INTRODUCTION
Under the fair use doctrine, certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted
material are not considered copyright infringement., Before the passage of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"),2 this meant that copy-
right holders had no legal tool to stop people from engaging in such fair
uses of their copyrighted works. Now, however, copyright holders can use
both technological and legal tools to prevent individuals from engaging in
unauthorized fair use of their copyrighted material by incorporating techno-
logical protection measures into digital media products. 3 These protection
measures (when successful) physically prevent the user from accessing or
copying, or both, content stored on digital media. The DMCA prohibits
circumvention of technological protection measures that control access to
copyrighted works, regardless of whether the user circumvents the access-
control measure for a non-infringing purpose, such as fair-use copying.4 On
the other hand, it is not a violation of the DMCA to circumvent technologi-
cal control measures that do not control access to a copyrighted work, but
merely prevent certain uses of the work, such as copying or modification.5
Yet, even though the DMCA allows circumvention of protection measures
that do not control access to a work, the DMCA does prohibit distribution
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2005; B.A.,
English, B.A., Spanish, University of Washington, 2001. The author would like to thank Dean Harold
Krent for providing a stimulating environment in which to study law, Professor Graeme Dinwoodie for
his insight into intellectual property law and guidance through all stages of the writing process, Profes-
sor Mickie Vogues Piatt for her help in submitting an earlier version of this Note as part of ASCAP's
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, and Ryan Liebl and Brian Orr for their useful comments on
earlier drafts of this Note.
1. 17 U.S.C. § t07 (2000).
2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
3. See Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. BuS. L.J. 1, 26-28, 33-
36 (2002).
4. 17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
5. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29 (1998).
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of devices or expertise that enable circumvention of technological protec-
tion measures that prevent access or specific uses of copyrighted material, 6
which effectively prevents all but the most technologically savvy consum-
ers from doing either. Thus, whereas copyright holders had little or no abil-
ity to prevent fair uses and other non-infringing uses of their copyrighted
works before passage of the DMCA, copyright holders now have the tech-
nological and legal tools to prevent nearly all instances of unauthorized
use, whether "fair" or not.
This Note will discuss how the current technological and legal para-
digm expands copyright holders' control beyond the scope of the fair use
doctrine, how this threatens reasonably developed consumer expectations
of such use, and how requiring the authorship industries to fully disclose
the characteristics of technological protection measures embedded in digi-
tal media products can protect consumer expectations and fair use while
enhancing the efficiency and responsiveness of the market for such prod-
ucts. The first section will provide background on the fair use doctrine and
other non-infringing exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright holders,
the development of digital media and technological protection measures,
and the passage of the DMCA. The second section will explain how the
confluence of technological protection measures and the DMCA expands
authors' control over the use of their works. The third section will describe
how digital media consumers have developed a reasonable expectation of
certain non-infringing uses. By requiring that digital media products be
labeled with the characteristics of any technological protection measures
restricting their use, these consumer expectations can be protected and used
as a market incentive to keep copyright holders from prohibiting customary
and expected non-infringing uses of their works, while at the same time
enhancing the efficiency and responsiveness of the market for digital media
products.
I. FAIR USE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE DMCA
A. The History of the Fair Use Defense to Copyright Infringement
Before the American Revolution and the creation of the United States,
English courts began applying exceptions to their copyright statute (the
Statute of Anne) in certain cases, allowing defendants to use copyrighted
material without authorization of the copyright holder.7 While Master of
6. 17 U.S.C§§ 1201(a)(2), 1201(b).
7. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3-17 (1985).
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Rolls Sir Thomas Clarke stated in 1761 that every such case "must depend
upon its own circumstances,"8 the courts considered a number of factors,
including the creative nature of the use,9 the public benefit of the use,' 0 the
existence of a custom of such use and its results,I I and the presence of good
faith on behalf of the defendant 12 to determine whether unauthorized use of
copyrighted material was acceptable. In Sayre v. Moore,13 Lord Mansfield
explained the policy behind such limitations to a copyright holder's right of
exclusion:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial;
the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the ser-
vice of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the
reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be
deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.'
4
Two years after Lord Mansfield articulated this balance of private in-
centive against public benefit, the framers of the United States Constitution
included a similar balance of interests in the primary legal document of the
United States. The United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
have Power ... [tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."'5 In the words of Supreme
Court Justice Stanley Reed, "[t]he economic philosophy behind the [Con-
stitution's copyright clause] is the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'16
In other words, granting an author the exclusive private right to use his
original works is not an end in itself, but a tool by which the framers hoped
to secure the public welfare through "the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts."17
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story is often credited with pronounc-
ing the first articulation of the fair use exception in the United States while
sitting as a Circuit Justice in the case of Folsom v. Marsh.18 The plaintiff in
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id. at 6-7.
10. Id. at6-7, 10.
11. Id. at 8.
12. ld. at9-10.
13. Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b) (1801) (quoting Sayre v. Moore (1785)).
14. Id. at 140.
15, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, Cl. 8.
16. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
17. U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 8.
18. PATRY, supra note 7, at 18; see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4901).
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Folsom held the copyright on letters written by George Washington, edited
them, and included them in an original biography of Washington.19 The
defendant later published a two-volume work in the style of Washington's
autobiography by editing together excerpts of Washington's writings, in-
cluding the letters used in the plaintiffs work, to which the plaintiff held
the copyright.20 The defendant argued that he did not infringe the plaintiff s
copyright because "[a]n author has a right to quote, select, extract or
abridge from another, in the composition of a work essentially new." 21
Although Story held that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's copy-
righted letters was an infringement, he stated that some unauthorized use of
copyrighted material does not constitute infringement.22 He noted and dis-
tinguished two extreme and opposite uses of copyrighted material. He pre-
sented a situation in which "the whole substance of one work has been
copied from another, with slight omissions and formal differences only" as
an obvious case of infringement. 23 On the other extreme, Story presented
the example of a critic using excerpts of a copyrighted work:
[N]o one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the
original work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages
for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the other
hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of
the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of
the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will
be deemed in law a piracy.24
Story recognized, however, that a "wide interval might, of course, ex-
ist between these two extremes" in any given case25 and said that, when
determining whether unauthorized use is infringement, the court must
"look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original
work."26 Notably, Justice Story praised the Folsom defendant's work as a
valuable contribution and recognized a public interest in the continued
publication of the work,2 7 but held that it was an infringement nonetheless
because its value derived not from original creation, but from the value of
19. Folsom, 9 F Cas. at 343.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 344,
22. Id. at 344-45, 349.
23. Id. at 344.
24. Id. at 344-45.
25. Id. at 345.
26. Id. at 348.
27. Id. at 349.
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the plaintiff's copyrighted material.28 The fair use exception to copyright
infringement remained a creature of common law development until 1976,
when Congress incorporated the doctrine into the Copyright Act.29 The Act
states:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work.., for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching.. . , scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit edu-
cational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
30
The Copyright Act's legislative history indicates that the codification
of the fair use doctrine was intended only to provide a guide as to what
factors were considered in determining whether use is "fair," and not to
modify the doctrine as it had been developed by the courts.31 In fact, the
House of Representatives Report on the Copyright Act specifically states
that the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act were intended to endorse
the purpose behind the judicial doctrine of fair use, were not intended to
freeze the doctrine at its 1976 state of development, and that the courts
must be free to interpret asserted fair use defenses on a case-by-case basis
after codification. 32
The fair use doctrine has undergone significant development at the
hands of the judiciary and Congress since its codification in 1976. Fur-
thermore, the fair use doctrine is not the only exception to the exclusive
rights of copyright holders. Congress has carved out other exceptions to the
exclusive rights of copyright holders that insulate users from infringement
liability. For example, it is not an infringement for businesses to publicly
perform copyrighted songs on certain equipment,33 despite the otherwise
exclusive public performance right of songwriters. 34 Nor are users who
28. Id.
29. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
31. H.R. RFP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
32. Id.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
34. Id. § 106(4).
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make a personal, noncommercial copy of a digital sound recording liable
for infringement in most cases, 35 despite the copyright holder's otherwise
exclusive right to copy or authorize copying of his work.36 To fully under-
stand how these non-infringing exceptions to the exclusive rights of copy-
right holders pertain to the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, it
is necessary to understand how copying and distribution technology has
progressed in the period since the codification of the fair use doctrine.
B. The Development of Digital Media and Technological Protection
Measures
Before the advent of digital media, all media was analog. An analog
signal is continuous and represents "an infinite number of smooth grada-
tions between given levels of signal strength" onto the analog recording
media.37 For example, an analog tape recorder takes such an electrical sig-
nal and applies it to an electromagnet in the record head.38 "As the tape
passes over the [recording] head, it is magnetized to varying degrees, de-
pending on the strength of the signal feeding the electromagnet at that mo-
ment in time." 39 In this sense, the level of magnetization on the tape at any
given moment has a 1:1 correlation with the signal source; it is analogous
to the source. When playing back the tape, the process is reversed and "the
varying magnetic field on the tape produces a varying electrical signal as
the tape is pulled across the playback head."40 This electrical signal is then
sent to a speaker.41
Digital media is fundamentally different. Instead of relying on a signal
whose fluctuations and variances have a 1:1 correlation with the fluctua-
tions of the source material, digital recording devices convert the source
information into binary code, a series of "l"s and "O"s (digits), which is
stored on digital media.42 For example, sound is recorded onto compact
35. Id. § 1008.
36. Id. § 106(1).
37. Boston University, Webcentral, From Analog to Digital (Oct. 24, 2002), at
http://www.bu.edu/webcentral/-leaming/avl/analog-digital.html.
38. Ferromagnetic materials, such as audio recording tape, can be magnetized by the application
of an external magnetic field. G.E. Pedretti, The Analog vs. Digital Recording Debate I.- A Primer for
Musicians, Tip TOP SOUND, pt. 3, at http://www.tiptopsound.com/articles.asp?ArticlelD=4&Page=3
(last visited Jan. 8, 2005) (citing Kelin J. Kuhn, Magnetic Recording-An Introduction, at




42. Id. pt. 4, at http://www.tiptopsound.com/articles.asp?ArticlelD=4&Page=4 (last visited Jan. 8,
2005).
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discs by making a series of binary representations on the disc. 43 Each bi-
nary representation on the CD, called a sample, represents the frequency of
the source material at a single instant.44 This binary representation of the
source material must then be decoded and converted to an analog electric
signal that can be run through speakers in order to be heard.45 In the case of
compact discs, this conversion and playback occurs at a rate of 44,100
samples per second, approximating a continuous stream of sound to the
human ear.46
For the purposes of this Note, the most important difference between
analog and digital media is the relative amount of quality degradation re-
sulting from the generation of analog copies, in comparison to the genera-
tion of digital copies. Generating an analog copy results in degradation of
quality from the master, and a further degradation in quality follows with
each subsequent generation.47 Despite this flaw in analog recording and
duplication, as home electronics became increasingly common, industrial
copyright holders attempted to prevent distribution of technology that
would allow consumers to make analog copies of copyrighted content at
home.48
In 1975, Sony introduced the Betamax home video cassette recorder.
49
The following year, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions
sued Sony under the theory of contributory copyright infringement, arguing
that the Betamax was used to make unauthorized copies of their copy-
righted television shows and movies.50 By suing Sony rather than individ-
ual infringers, the studios could attempt to get the means of copying out of
the public's hands, and possibly attempt to force Sony to pay royalties as
part of a licensing arrangement.5' However, the Supreme Court held that
using the Betamax to "time-shift" freely broadcasted television content for
noncommercial purposes (i.e., recording a television show that is originally
broadcast at an inconvenient time in order to watch it at a later, more con-
venient time) was fair use and did not infringe on the plaintiffs' copy-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. However, this digital-to-analog conversion need not occur simply to transfer information from
one digital medium, such as a CD, to another, such as a hard drive.
46. Id.
47. Sharp, supra note 3, at 20-21; see also TechWeb: The Business Technology Network,
TechEncyclopedia, Analog, at http://www.techweb.comencyclopedia/defineterm.jhtml?tern=analog
(last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
48. Sharp, supra note 3, at 19-20.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 19-20.
51. Id. at20.
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rights.52 Thus, the Court held that the Betamax was "capable of substantial
noninfringing use," and that Sony could not be held liable for contributory
infringement for selling it.3 Videocassette recorders subsequently became
a popular and widely used mechanism for making analog copies of copy-
righted audiovisual content at home.
With the development of digital media, it became possible to make
theoretically identical copies of copyrighted works with the push of a but-
ton, with no degradation in quality from generation to generation.5 4 No
quality degradation occurs because creating a digital copy only involves
copying a series of numbers.55 As long as those numbers stay the same, and
in the same order, the copy should be exactly the same as the original, with
none of the "noise" that can be introduced through analog copying. During
the 1990s, the increasing power and ubiquity of personal computers, digital
transmission systems like the World Wide Web, and the development of
information compression protocols such as MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3
("MP3") not only made it easy for a large number of people to make iden-
tical copies of copyrighted material, but also to distribute these copies to
the masses.
However, before the MP3, there was the Digital Audio Tape ("DAT").
The first DAT recorders were demonstrated in 1986 and provided the abil-
ity to make perfect digital copies of audio content at home.5 6 In response to
the perceived threat DAT recorders posed to the recording industry, Con-
gress passed the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA") in 1992.57 The
AHRA mandated that all consumer-oriented digital audio recording devices
incorporate a Serial Copy Management System58 and that a royalty be paid
on the sale of certain digital audio recording devices and units of digital
audio media.59 However, in an attempt to protect consumers' ability to
engage in certain uses of audio content on digital media, the AHRA insu-
lated consumers from infringement liability based on noncommercial copy-
ing of audio content using the devices or media covered by the act. 60 Thus,
at the time the AHRA was passed, it allowed consumers to make unauthor-
ized, noncommercial digital copies of copyrighted content without fear of
52. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984).
53. Id. at 456.
54. Sharp, supra note 3, at 21; see also TechWeb: The Business Technology Network, supra note
47.
55. Sharp, supra note 3, at 21.
56. Id.
57. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).
59. Id. §§ 1003-04.
60. Id. § 1008.
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legal liability.6 1 In exchange, a portion of the money consumers spent on
the devices and media used to make such copies is deposited in a royalty
pool, which is then distributed to copyright holders.62
However, the AHRA does not apply to personal computers or their
hard drives when used as audio recording devices or storage media.63 The
law only applies to devices "the digital recording function of which is de-
signed or marketed for the primary purpose of... making a digital audio
copied recording for private use" 64 and media "that is primarily marketed
or most commonly used by consumers for the purpose of making digital
audio copied recordings by use of a digital audio recording device."65 Be-
cause computers and their hard drives are not primarily marketed for their
digital audio recording abilities, they are not covered by the AHRA.66 This
limitation became important as computers became one of the most common
devices used to record, play, copy, and transmit copyrighted content.
During the 1990s, compact discs became the gold standard for audio
recording, Digital Versatile Discs ("DVDs") became common as media for
audiovisual content, and personal computers (not covered by the AHRA
and not bound to incorporate the SCMS) became the device of choice for
copying, manipulating, and distributing the content stored on these media.
However, the steady march of technological progress not only increased
consumers' ability to manipulate digital content, but also increased copy-
right holders' ability to protect content stored on digital media. 67 Techno-
logical protection measures incorporated into digital media can physically
prevent access to the content stored on such media, except by certain ap-
proved devices or by users who know a password, and can prevent digital
copying of the content.68
61. This is still the case under the terms of the AHRA, as long as the content the user attempts to
copy is not protected by a technological protection measure that prevents access to the work. Id.
§ 1201(a)(1)(A).
62. Id. §§ 1003-07.
63. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1076-
78 (9th Cir. 1999).
64. 17 u.s.c. § 1001(3).
65. Id. § 1001(4)(A).
66. See Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1078.
67 Sharp, supra note 3, at 27-28 (citing PCTechGuide-The PC Technology Guide, Content
Protection, at http://www.pctechguide.com/l 0dvdContent-protection.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2003)).
68. However, most technological protection measures do not decrease consumers' ability to make
analog copies through more traditional methods. While technological protection measures may prevent
the user from doing many things, they do not prevent the user from making an analog copy by pointing
a camcorder at the television screen while playing a DVD, or holding a microphone up to the speakers
while playing an audio CD.
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For example, in 1996, the DVD Forum, a group comprised of and rep-
resenting over 230 industrial copyright holders, agreed to incorporate a
technological protection measure known as the Content Scramble System
("CSS") into all DVDs sold by group members. 69 CSS encrypts the digital
information stored on the DVD (known as "scrambling") so that it cannot
be played or copied by a DVD player, unless the DVD player incorporates
the technological "key" needed to descramble the information. 70 A manu-
facturer of DVD players must pay a licensing fee in order to use the de-
cryption key necessary to make such a player functional.71 The DVD
Forum used different encryption and decryption keys in different regions of
the world, attempting to ensure that DVDs sold in one region could only be
played by DVD players sold in the same region.7 2 Technology such as this
allows the copyright holder to physically restrain consumers' ability to use
their copyrighted content, regardless of whether the user is infringing on
the copyright.
Yet, copy prevention technology such as this is fallible. In fact, by
1999, a piece of computer code known as DeCSS designed to descramble
the CSS protection measure on DVDs began circulating on the internet.73
While early versions of DeCSS consisted of sixty lines of code, 74 similar
circumvention programs have been condensed down to seven lines.75 But
while DeCSS was not a particularly long or complicated piece of code,
even simpler methods to circumvent technological protection measures
were discovered. In May of 2002, Reuters news service published a story
detailing how a simple felt-tipped marker could be used to circumvent
Sony's Key2Audio protection technology.76 While a Celine Dion CD
equipped with the Key2Audio technology could not be played on a per-
sonal computer originally, it not only played, but its content was copied
onto the hard drive of a computer after the edge of the CD was blacked out
69. Sharp, supra note 3, at 27.
70. Id. at 27-28.
71. Id. at 28.
72. PCTechGuide-The PC Technology Guide, Regional Coding, at http://www.pctechguide.-
com/1OdvdRegional-coding.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2003). This technology impairs the market for
"gray goods"-goods sold at a low competitive price in one market (e.g., Hong Kong), imported into
another market with a higher competitive price (e.g., the United States), then sold below that second
market's competitive price.
73. Sharp, supra note 3, at 47.
74. Id.
75. Declan McCullagh, Descramble that DVD in 7 Lines, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.-
wired.conVnews/print0,1294,42259,00.html (Mar. 7, 2001). DeCSS became so popular that it was even
printed on t-shirts. The author's roommate at the University of Washington owned one such shirt that
read "Got DeCSS?" on the front, and "You do now! [DeCSS code]" on the back.
76. Reuters, CD Crack: Magic Marker Indeed (May 20, 2002), WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/-technology/0, 1 282,52665,00.html.
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with the felt-tipped marker.7 7 In October of 2003, Alex Halderman, a
Princeton computer science student, published a paper detailing the ease
with which he circumvented SunComm's latest technological protection
measure. 78 Halderman circumvented SunComm's MediaMax CD3 technol-
ogy installed on an Anthony Hamilton CD simply by holding down the
"shift" key on his personal computer while loading the CD.79 This disabled
Microsoft Windows' "autorun" function, preventing the protection measure
embedded in the CD from installing the driver designed to prevent
copying.80
Thus, while copyright holders and technology companies have made
progress in the fight to physically control consumers' ability to manipulate
content stored and sold on digital media, these efforts are far from reaching
perfection.
C. Technological Protection Measures Under the WIPO Treaties and the
DMCA
While copyright holders' efforts to create technology that prevents un-
authorized use of copyrighted material have produced mixed results, their
efforts to create a legal mechanism for preventing such use have been much
more successful. In 1998, Congress enacted the DMCA.81 The DMCA was
enacted in an effort to implement provisions of the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty.82 These two treaties require signatory
nations to adopt:
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used
by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under
this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in re-
spect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors con-
cerned or permitted by law. 83
The DMCA contains anti-circumvention provisions prohibiting both
the act of circumventing technological protection measures and the distri-
bution or sale of technology that enables a user to circumvent such meas-
77. Id.
78. Brij Khurana, Halderman GS Sees Copy-protection Flaw in New CDs, DAILY PRINCETONIAN,
Oct. 9, 2003, at http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2003/10/09/news/8785.sbtml.
79. Id.
80, Id.
81. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
82. H.R. REP. No. 105-551,pt. 1,at9(1998).
83. Id. at 17.
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ures.84 However, the DMCA distinguishes between measures that "control
access" to copyrighted content and measures that protect a copyright
holder's rights in such content.85 The DMCA prohibits the sale or distribu-
tion of any device or technology that is "primarily designed or produced for
the purpose of' circumventing access-prevention or rights-protection tech-
nology, or has "only limited commercially significant purpose or use" other
than to circumvent either type of protection measure.8 6 Yet the DMCA only
prohibits the act of circumventing access-control measures, while the act of
circumventing rights-protection measures cannot be punished under the
DMCA.87 In other words, the DMCA prohibits the distribution of devices
aimed at circumventing access-control or rights-protection measures, or
both, but only prohibits the act of circumventing access-control measures,
leaving the act of circumventing rights-protection measures unpunished.
This scheme clearly raises the question: what is the difference be-
tween access-control measures and rights-protection measures? The
DMCA itself does not define the term "access," but the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky recently adopted the Mer-
riam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary definition, holding that "access" to
copyrighted content "is the 'ability to enter, to obtain, or to make use of "
such content.88 Commentators such as R. Anthony Reese suggest that the
term "is likely to be read broadly, probably extending to any act by which
the work is made perceptible."8 9 For example, the CSS used on DVDs
likely would be considered an access-protection measure because one can-
not view or interact with the content stored on a DVD without a DVD
player that contains the relevant region key. The issue of defining "a tech-
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (2000).
85. R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Struc-
ture of]Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 622-23 (2003).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) prohibits distribution of technology aimed at circumventing access-
prevention technology. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) prohibits distribution of technology aimed at circum-
venting rights protection technology.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
88. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 967-68 (E.D_
Ky. 2003) (holding that an authentication sequence that must be completed before interacting with a
copyrighted computer program stored on microchips in toner cartridges "controls access" to a copy-
righted work), rev 'd on other grounds, 387 F.3d 522, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004) (accepting district court's
definition of"access," but holding that authentification sequence did not "effectively control access" to
copyrighted computer program because program could be copied without circumventing authentifica-
tion sequence). The United States District Court for the District of Maine recently held that a defendant
violated the "access control" anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA without defining the term
"access." See Pearl Invs., LLC v. Standard 1/0, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 349-50 (D. Me. 2003)
(password protection on private network "effectively controlled access" to works stored on that net-
work).
89. Reese, supra note 85, at 627-28.
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nological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner" 90
(a rights-protection measure) is a bit trickier.
The DMCA defines a rights-protection measure as one that, "in the
ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the
exercise of a right of a copyright owner" under title 1 7.91 This definition is
inherently limited to the scope of a copyright holder's exclusive rights. As
mentioned above, those rights are not unlimited. Because a copyright
holder has no right to stop a user from engaging in non-infringing use, the
copyright holder's exclusive rights necessarily end where the fair use doc-
trine and other non-infringement exceptions begin. Like the yin and yang
of copyright law, they form each others' boundaries. So, a protection
measure that prevents users from making multiple copies of a copyrighted
sound recording for commercial purposes "effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner," because the copyright owner has the right to stop such
infringing copies from being made.9 2 However, that same protection meas-
ure might prevent a user from making a noncommercial copy of a sound
recording for home backup purposes. In that case, the technology is not
protecting "the right of the copyright owner," because the copyright owner
has no right to stop the user from making such a copy under the AHRA.93
At first glance, this scheme may not appear to greatly change copy-
right holders' effective rights and ability to control use of their works.
Those engaging in non-infringing use of a copyrighted work are (a) likely
to have authorized access to the content, so circumventing access-control
measures would not be necessary, and (b) rights-protection measures ap-
pear to be legally backed up only to the extent that they protect a copyright
holder's exclusive rights, which do not extend into the realm of non-
infringing use. However, as shown below, a detailed evaluation reveals that
the confluence of technological protection measures, the anti-
circumvention act provisions, and the anti-circumvention device provisions
of the DMCA significantly alter the landscape of copyright law and the
market for copyrighted works by providing copyright holders with a near-
absolute defacto ability to control use of their works.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1).
91. Id. § 1201(b)(2)(B).
92. See id. § 106(1) ("[Tlhe owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.").
93. See id. § 1008 ("No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright
based on... noncommercial use by a consumer of [certain media or devices] for making ... musical
recordings.").
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II. THE DMCA GIVES COPYRIGHT HOLDERS A DE FACTO ABILITY TO
STOP FAIR USE
The DMCA expressly states that its passage does not at all change the
contours of the fair use defense to copyright infringement.94 Many legisla-
tors also praised the DMCA for achieving balanced protection of copyright
holders' proprietary interests and the public's interest in fair use. 95 How-
ever, fair use and other non-infringement exceptions only apply to copy-
right infringement suits. The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA
create an entirely new cause of action that copyright holders can use to
prevent unauthorized use of their works, whether infringing or not. No-
where in the act is fair use mentioned as a defense to a circumvention law-
suit.96 Thus, while copyright holders' ability to control the use of their
works was previously limited to infringing uses, they now have the techno-
logical and legal tools to stop non-infringing use of their copyrighted
works, and possibly some uses of public domain works, through techno-
logical protection measures and the threat or use of circumvention lawsuits
under the DMCA.
The provision that most obviously and directly expands copyright
holders' rights into the arena of fair use is the prohibition on circumventing
access-control measures. 97 Before the passage of the DMCA, a copyright
holder had no legal method of preventing a user from engaging in non-
infringing use of his work, even if it was physically possible to do so with
technological protection measures. However, a copyright holder can now
use the threat of a circumvention lawsuit (or injunctive relief resulting from
such a suit) to prevent users from merely obtaining access to a work,
whether or not the use for which such access is sought would infringe the
copyright, simply by incorporating an access-control measure into the digi-
tal media on which the work is distributed. The rationale behind this provi-
sion is that those who legally purchase digital media products will not need
to circumvent such access-control measures. 98 However, this is not neces-
sarily the case.
For example, playing a legally purchased compact disc at home on a
personal computer is a non-infringing use. 99 Yet, if the CD were Celine
94. Id. § 1201(c)(1).
95. See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 673, 725-26 & nn. 280-83 (2000).
96. See generally 17U.S.C. § 1201.
97. Id. § 1201(a)(1).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17-18 (1998).
99. This would not violate any of the exclusive rights listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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Dion's A New Day Has Come, Sony's Key2Audio protection technology
would prevent a legitimate consumer from playing the CD on a personal
computer. Because Key2Audio causes the music on the CD to be imper-
ceptible when placed in a personal computer's CD drive, it likely would be
considered an access-control measure. Thus, because the DMCA prohibits
circumventing access-control measures, a consumer who blacks out the
edge of his recently purchased CD with a felt-tipped marker in order to
play the CD on his personal computer would be liable for up to $2,500 in
statutory damages,100 even though he would not be infringing any of the
copyright holder's exclusive rights. This scenario exemplifies the DMCA's
de facto expansion of copyright holders' right to control use of their works
and the consumer protection issues raised by such expansion, which are
discussed further below.
However, the DMCA does not prohibit all circumvention of access-
control measures. Nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions
may circumvent access-control measures for the purpose of making a good
faith determination of whether to acquire a copy of the protected work,
unless the work is reasonably available in another form.10l Circumvention
of access-control measures is allowed for the purpose of encryption re-
search, 102 protecting dissemination of private information,103 reverse engi-
neering to achieve software interoperability,104 and for security testing.
05
The DMCA does not prohibit the act of circumventing protection measures
that do not control access, such as measures that solely prohibit copying the
protected work,106 under the theory that most instances of such circumven-
tion "will occur in the course of conduct which itself implicates the copy-
right owner's rights" under title 17.107
But even if we were to accept that the above exceptions to liability for
the act of circumvention strike a fair balance between the copyright mo-
nopoly and fair use, such a balance is without any practical effect because
100- 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c).
101. Id. § 1201(d)(1)-(2).
102. This must involve a legitimately obtained encryption copy and good faith research. Id.
§ 1201(g)
103- Id. § 1201(i).
104. Id. § 1201(f)(1).
105. Id. § 1201(j).
106. Although the Lexmark court held that a device controlled "access" to a work because it con-
trolled a user's ability "to make use of" the work, 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 968 (E.D. Ky. 2003), the
DMCA's inherent distinction between access-control measures and rights-protection measures, see
generally 17 U.S.C. § 1201, suggests that protection measures that solely prohibit exercise of a copy-
right holder's exclusive right, such as copying, while not preventing perception of the protected work
should not be considered access-control measures.
107. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 29(1998).
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the DMCA prohibits distribution of devices that circumvent technological
protection measures. 08 Thus, even those individuals and institutions that
are allowed to circumvent access-control measures under the DMCA's
exemptions will have no means to do so unless they can develop an effec-
tive circumvention method on their own. Furthermore, everyone is allowed
to circumvent protection measures that do not control access to the copy-
righted work, but because authors can use the device provisions of the
DMCA to keep the technology necessary to engage in such circumvention
off the market and out of the hands of consumers, only the most techno-
logically savvy among us will be able to take advantage of this allowed
circumvention. Of course, if use-protection measures continue to fall prey
to such simple circumvention devices as felt-tipped markers and the "shift"
key, there may not be cause for much alarm. But as technology progresses,
that almost certainly will not be the case.
The DMCA does not make it crystal clear which devices aimed at cir-
cumventing rights-protection measures are prohibited and which are not.
The DMCA prohibits devices that are primarily designed for, marketed for,
or have a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than cir-
cumventing "protection afforded by a technological measure that effec-
tively protects a right of a copyright owner under [title 17J."109 A measure
that "effectively protects a right of a copyright owner" is one that "in the
ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the
exercise of a right of a copyright owner" under title 17.110 So, even if a
protection measure often prevents actions that are not the exclusive right of
the copyright owner, such as non-infringing copying of sound recordings
under 17 U.S.C. § 1008, it likely will still be covered under the definition
of a "rights protection measure" if it also prevents actions that are the ex-
clusive right of the copyright owner, such as commercial duplication of
sound recordings, in the "ordinary course of its operation."l"' This means
that a device that is marketed and primarily designed for circumventing
technological protection measures only in cases of non-infringing use will
still be prohibited under the device provisions of the DMCA if it can also
regularly be used to circumvent such measures for infringing purposes."12
Seeing as it is probably impossible to create a circumvention device that
only works for non-infringing purposes, the DMCA likely will prohibit
distribution of all circumvention devices.
108. 17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2),(b).
109. Id. § 1201(b).
110. Id. § 1201(b)(2)(B).
Ill. See id.
112. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d III1, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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The practical effect of this confluence of new law and new technology
is that copyright holders can now use injunctive relief and the threat of civil
or criminal penalties to legally prevent fair use and other non-infringing
uses that they previously could not. When an infringement action was the
sole arrow in the legal quiver of copyright holders, the fair use defense kept
copyright holders from stopping such fair uses through the courts. Now,
however, the copyright monopoly has been expanded to the point where
copyright holders can confer upon themselves a nearly unlimited de facto
right of exclusion simply by incorporating access-control measures into all
media on which their work is distributed."13 Under this new paradigm,
members of the public will lack the technology necessary to engage in fair
use, will face lawsuits for circumventing the access-control measures nec-
essary to engage in fair use, or will have to pay the copyright holders for
the privilege of legally disabling access controls so that they can engage in
the desired fair use.
In fact, through the use of access-control measures, content providers
could even give themselves some legal rights over public domain works in
which they do not own a copyright. For example, if the Art Institute of
Chicago Museum (the "Art Institute") were to create a web site containing
digital representations of its most famous public domain works, it could
obtain defacto legal protection over these public domain works simply by
employing technology that requires use of a password to view the web
site. 114 Even though the Art Institute cannot stop people from copying these
works from another source, or even from circumventing anti-copying
measures on its web site, anybody wanting to copy the public domain
works from the site would necessarily need to pay for the required pass-
word or face a lawsuit for circumventing an access-control measure, be-
cause copying the works on the website would necessarily entail accessing
the works. This may not be a significant problem now, because public do-
main works are usually readily available from multiple sources and, in the
scenario described above, the Art Institute could only stop users from copy-
ing from their site. But, as more content distributors begin to employ ac-
cess-control measures, it may become very difficult to copy or merely
access public domain works without paying for the privilege. This ex-
panded de facto right of exclusion bestowed upon copyright holders by the
113. Haimo Schack calls this a "paracopyright" in Anti-Circumvention Measures and Restrictions
in Licensing Contracts us Instruments for Preventing Competition and Fair Use, 2002 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 321, 324 (2002).
114. This scenario, however, would depend on the works not being available through any other
source.
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new techno-legal paradigm has been the subject of several scholarly arti-
cles criticizing the DMCA. 115
III. MANDATORY LABELING CAN DISCOURAGE ABUSE OF COPYRIGHT
HOLDERS' EXPANDED DE FACTO RIGHT OF EXCLUSION BY USING
CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AS A MARKET INCENTIVE
As the preceding sections made clear, copyright holders now have a
broad power to stop the public from engaging in non-infringing use of their
works distributed on digital media that did not exist before passage of the
DMCA. However, the mere fact that copyright holders have such a broad
power to prohibit non-infringing use of their works does not necessarily
mean that they will choose to exercise this power broadly. One could ar-
gue, on the one hand, that granting such power invites abuse, but on the
other, that the authorship industries will not abuse such power because it
would alienate their customer base. As explained below, both sides of the
argument regarding whether copyright holders will abuse their expanded
right to control their works, and that this right should be limited, depend
largely on the reasonable expectations of non-infringing use developed by
consumers of digital media products.
A. Consumers have developed reasonable expectations regarding non-
infringing uses of digital media products.
Because of this country's long history of protecting fair use rights and
the development and advertising of home media technology, consumers
have built up a reasonable expectation that they will have both the right and
the ability to engage in certain non-infringing uses of the digital media
products they purchase. For example, Toshiba advertises their Satellite and
Qosmio notebook computers by touting their ability to play, record, and
copy CDs, DVDs, and television programs. 116 In fact, Toshiba advertises its
Qosmio series notebook as a four-in-one television, DVD player, CD
player, and personal computer.1 7 When a user loads an audio CD into the
drive of a personal computer running Microsoft's Windows XP Pro operat-
ing system, a window automatically pops up giving the user the option to
copy the files on the CD to the computer's hard drive using Windows Me-
115. E.g. id.; Sharp, supra note 3.
116. The exact URL on which these advertisements are or were displayed is subject to constant
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dia Player. 1 8 Windows Media Player, media manipulation software that
comes standard with the Windows XP operating system, also enables the
user to "copy files to portable devices and recordable CDs." 119 In short,
computer hardware and software sellers tout their products' ability to em-
power consumers to play, copy, transmit, and otherwise manipulate digital
media as significant selling points.
Because of the rapid development of such home media technology and
its advertisement, consumers have built up a reasonable expectation that
they will be able to engage in certain home uses of the digital media prod-
ucts they buy. A consumer who buys a CD released by a Sony subsidiary
music label would probably expect to be able to play that disc not only on
Sony brand CD players, but on all stand-alone CD players and personal
computers with CD drives. He might also reasonably expect to be able to
make personal backup copy of the disc on his hard drive, or reorder indi-
vidual songs on a "mix" CD,120 using the Windows Media Player software
that comes preinstalled on nearly all personal computers.12 1 Such expecta-
tions are reasonable because copyright holders have never had the legal
ability to stop such uses in the past, have not physically attempted to stop
such uses until very recently, and users are bombarded with hardware and
software advertisements touting such media manipulation ability as stan-
dard selling points.
Yet, with the development of technological protection measures em-
bedded in digital media products, a consumer may very well find out that
some digital media products do not meet such reasonable expectations of
use, after paying for the product. A consumer paying $15.00 for Celine
Dion's A New Day Has Come might reasonably believe that he has pur-
chased the ability to play that CD on his personal computer, create a
backup copy on his hard drive, add certain songs from the CD onto a "mix"
play list on his hard drive or a CD-R, and maybe convert some songs to
MP3 form so he can play them on his portable MP3 player when he goes
118. Microsoft's Windows Media Player FAQ touts the Player's ability to manipulate works in
such a way, containing headings titled "Ripping (Copying from) CDs" and "Burning (Copying to)
CDs." Windows Media, Windows Media Player FAQ, available at http://www.microsoft.-
com/windows/windowsmedia/9series/player/faq.aspx (last updated Dec. 2004).
119. The quoted text pops up when the user moves his personal computer's cursor over the "Copy
to CD or Device" tab on Windows Media Player distributed with Windows XP Pro.
120. A "mix" CD is a compilation of songs copied from different artists or albums, placed in a
personalized order, and burned onto a CD-R or CD-RW.
121, See Rachel Konrad & May Wong, RealNetworks Sues Microsoft over Antitrust,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Dec. 19, 2003, at http://informationweek.com/story/showArticlejhtml?articlelD-
=17000378. Over 90% of Intel processor compatible personal computers, and over 80% of all personal
computers, use a Microsoft Windows operating system. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
CHICA GO-KENT LA WREVIEW
jogging. In reality, this hypothetical consumer would not have purchased
the ability to perform any of those acts with his new CD, and would actu-
ally incur legal liability if he were to do so, because the CD carries Sony's
Key2Audio access-control technology that prevents use on a personal com-
puter, the circumvention of which violates the DMCA.122
Granted, the problem of meeting consumer expectations presented by
the rapid development of technological protection measures and the law
that protects them is much more significant when the digital media carrying
the control measures is purchased. For example, it is a greater concern
when a consumer who pays $40.00 for a commemorative boxed set of The
Godfather trilogy on DVD discovers that he only acquired a small subset of
the rights and abilities he thought he had paid for, than if a user listening to
freely transmitted digital radio were to discover that he has fewer rights and
abilities than he thought he had received for free. Furthermore, as it be-
comes more common for consumers to use one hardware device, such as a
personal computer, for all of their home digital media needs, the ability of
copyright holders to limit a digital media product's usefulness on certain
devices, without informing consumers, becomes a greater concern.
B. The expectation of non-infringing uses could keep authors from heav-
ily restricting such uses (but has not yet).
Although it is clear that the copyright holders now have the practical
capability to prohibit legitimate consumers from engaging in many fair
uses of their works purchased on digital media, this does not necessarily
mean that the authorship industries will actually go ahead and do so. In
fact, the reasonable expectations that consumers have developed regarding
their right and ability to make personal backup copies, transfer works into
different forms of digital media, and engage in other such uses could act as
a deterrent itself against abuse of authors' newly expanded use control
powers. In short, if consumers are accustomed to paying $15 for a digital
media product and receiving the right and ability to engage in many uses of
the work contained on that product, the authorship industries will have to
lower prices to convince consumers to buy products that allow the con-
sumer to engage in only a small subset of those uses, or accept a lower
gross number of sales of that product at the same price point. This could act
as a free market deterrent to industrial copyright holders who might other-
wise want to severely restrict the types of uses consumers are able to en-
gage in once they purchase a digital media product.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
[Vol 80:515534
2005] THE DIGITAL COPYRIGHT MILLENNIUM ACT AND NON-INFRINGING USE 535
Unfortunately, this incentive alone has, so far, not been strong enough
to deter content distributors incorporating protection measures on their
products that cause them not to meet reasonable customer expectations.
Although mere anecdotes, the examples of Celine Dion's A New Day Has
Come and Anthony Hamilton's Comin 'From Where I'm From demonstrate
this lack of deterrence. Furthermore, the threat posed by copyright holders'
expanded control over the use of their works is not simply that they will
actually prohibit non-infringing uses, but that they will force those who
wish to engage in such use to pay a licensing fee, even though such use is
not the exclusive right of the copyright holder. This was the threat kept at
bay by the Supreme Court's holding in Sony Corp. of America that "time-
shifting" analog television programs through the use of home VCRs was a
fair use. 123 Supposedly, the framers of the DMCA did not intend the act to
usher in this type of "pay-per-use" paradigm. 124
C. Mandatory labeling can increase market responsiveness, market effi-
ciency, and the incentive to refrain from abusing technological control
measures.
Requiring the authorship industries to clearly label their digital media
products with the acts prohibited by any technological protection measures
carried on such products would serve three public goods. First and fore-
most, such full disclosure will protect consumers' reasonable expectations
and ensure that consumers know what they are paying for, when they pay
for it. Second, by ensuring that digital media consumers are informed at the
time of purchase about the protection measures embedded in a potential
purchase, mandatory labeling would encourage the authorship industries to
refrain from severely restricting the uses allowed by the protection meas-
ures on their products. So far, the fear of a consumer backlash against me-
dia products that are heavily restricted by technological protection
measures has not stopped the authorship industries from employing such
measures. However, the authorship industries would be much less likely to
incorporate heavily restrictive technological protection measures on their
products if they had to list every act restricted by such measures on the
product itself, so that consumers are informed of the restrictions at the point
of purchase. Such a mandatory labeling requirement has already been en-
123- Sharp, supra note 3, at 20; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
447-55 (1984).
124. 144 CONG. REC. S11887 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
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acted in Germany.12 5 In France, at least one court has punished record label
EMI for selling CDs with a technological restriction that prevents the CDs
from being played in automobile CD players, holding that such an undis-
closed restriction constitutes a "hidden vice."126 Both France and Germany
must abide by a European Commission directive127 aimed at implementing
the WIPO Copyright Treaty28 that was the impetus for the DMCA, so
there is no reason to think that the United States would be accused of not
meeting its treaty obligations for implementing similar disclosure
requirements.
Third, by increasing the available information in the marketplace,
mandatory labeling of digital media products can enhance the responsive-
ness and efficiency of the market. The realm of food labeling is illustrative
of how mandatory labeling can so affect the market. Such labeling re-
quirements have been imposed in the realm of food products where the
market does not provide enough information for consumers to make pur-
chasing choices that mirror their individual preferences.129 Where the seller
does not disclose negative aspects of his product, the market is likely to
underproduce products that would be profitable if the consumers were fully
informed, while other, less-desirable products are produced at a higher rate
than they would be if consumers were fully informed of their negative
qualities. 30 For example, the labeling of health concerns on cereal boxes
has resulted in a change in consumer cereal purchasing patterns, which in
turn caused cereal producers to modify their products in an attempt to com-
ply with more desirable labels that meet market demands.131 This could
also be the case where a food product is very high in saturated fat, a charac-
teristic most consumers wish to avoid.
125. Thomas Ramsauer, Germany's Copyright Law on the Verge of the Information Age,
E.COPYRIGHT BULL., Dec. 2003, at 7, at http://portal.unesco,org/culture/en/file-download.php/e3ca-
707578a0ebf3f26d6b9961411052T.+Ramsauer+E.pdf.
126. Estelle Dumout, Syst~mes anticopie: la justice condamne EMI France pour vice cache,
ZDNET, Sept. 3, 2003, at http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/technologie/0,39020809,39116752,00.htm




127. Parliament and Commission Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 11.
128. Schack, supra note 113, at 324.
129. ELISE GOLAN, ET AL., ECONOMICS OF FOOD LABELING 13, 19 (EcON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC., ECON. REP. No. 793, Jan. 2001), at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer793/aer-
793.pdf.
130. Id. at 13.
131. See Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information, Advertising, and Health Choices: A
Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RAND J. ECONS. 459 (1990).
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Introducing a mandatory labeling scheme to correct the asymmetrical
distribution of information in the digital media product market (where pro-
ducers have relevant information about their products that consumers do
not) would make the market more responsive to consumer demand and
increase efficiency. "In properly functioning markets, consumers are able
to purchase the goods and services that best match their preferences. As a
result, society's resources are used in ways that match consumers' prefer-
ences."132 In the case of the digital media market, the content distributors
know which uses of their product are restricted by the protection measures
embedded therein, but the consumers of these products often do not. Thus,
consumers are not able to accurately reflect the true demands of the market
by purchasing only those products offering the characteristics they desire at
a price they are willing to spend. Instead, consumers may often buy a digi-
tal media product at a price they would not have been willing to spend, and
would not spend a second time, had they known the true characteristics of
the product, such as overly restrictive technological protection measures.
By empowering purchasers with the relevant knowledge at the point of
purchase, a mandatory labeling scheme for technological protection meas-
ures will allow the market to increase responsiveness and efficiency by
adjusting the supply of digital media products with certain attributes to
more closely reflect the demand for products with those attributes.
Mandatory labeling will also increase economic efficiency by reduc-
ing consumer search costs. For example, a consumer who uses his personal
computer for all his multimedia needs will only want to buy CDs that can
be played on a personal computer. If the consumer is not able to discern at
the point of purchase which CDs can be played on a personal computer, he
must spend time and effort researching which record labels use technologi-
cal control measures that prevent access on personal computers. This could
mean a series of trials and errors in which the consumer purchases CDs,
tests them, and only continues to buy CDs from the record labels whose
CDs work on his personal computer (spending more time to return those
that do not). Or, it could mean searching the internet or trade publications
for the same information. Either way, each individual consumer must ex-
pend great effort to find the products that fit his or her needs. Under a man-
datory labeling scheme, content distributors that already know the relevant
characteristics of their products, and in many cases already engage in label-
ing programs for explicit lyrics and content, can provide the necessary in-
formation during packaging, effectively reducing search costs by
streamlining the process of creating informed consumers.
132. GOLAN, supra note 129, at 13.
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It is true that, even without mandatory labeling, the market in digital
media products is likely to be more responsive than the food product mar-
ket because the distribution of information in the digital media market is
not quite as asymmetrical. For example, whereas both the food and digital
media consumer may lack relevant information at the point of purchase, the
digital media consumer likely will acquire the relevant information as soon
as he tries, and fails, to play his product in a prohibited device. On the other
hand, the food product consumer is not likely to learn the fat content or
growing conditions of his food simply by eating it. Still, even if a digital
media consumer can learn relevant information after purchase, wasted first-
time purchases of digital media products, and subsequent product returns,
are market inefficiencies that should not be written off. Furthermore, even
after a consumer learns that one digital media product does not meet his
needs, that knowledge does not automatically empower him with the in-
formation necessary to determine if any future purchases will meet his
needs. Thus, the greater amount of information digital media consumers are
able to acquire after purchase, relative to markets in some other products,
does not negate the fact that greater dissemination of information regarding
technological protection measures at the point of purchase will aid con-
sumers in making accurate purchases, increasing the responsiveness and
efficiency of the digital media market.
CONCLUSION
By empowering consumers with knowledge about technological pro-
tection measures that is currently lacking in the digital media marketplace
through a mandatory labeling scheme, we can strengthen consumers'
power to influence the authorship industries' decisions on whether and to
what degree they impose use restrictions on their products through techno-
logical control measures. Because consumers expect and desire to be able
to engage in a wide variety of uses on purchasing a digital media product, it
is unlikely that consumers will continue to pay the same price in the same
numbers for products that prohibit consumers from engaging in those
uses-if they are aware of these prohibitions at the point of purchase. By
enhancing the power of consumers to know what they are paying for and to
pay only for what they want, requiring full disclosure of the technological
protection measures carried on digital media products can become a power-
ful market incentive for content providers to refrain from prohibiting non-
infringing use of their products. Moreover, even though such a labeling
requirement might primarily be used as a consumer protection tool de-
signed to combat the industrial copyright holders' growing power, it could
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also end up aiding copyright holders. Labels identifying the uses for which
a digital media product is sold may end up conditioning media consumers
to think of digital media products as a bundle of rights that they are pur-
chasing. In the long run, this may help condition users and consumers into
thinking that certain uses of copyrighted works are acceptable, while others
are not. Such a mindset would go a long way to counteracting the "every-
thing is free" culture that has developed around file trading systems such as
Kazaa and Napster. 133
133. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 910-11 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(finding as fact that free download services such as defendant Napster, Inc., contribute to an attitude
that copyrighted music ought to be free), rev 'd in part on other grounds, A&M Records, Inc. v. Nap-
ster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
